CIVIL SOCIETY IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS, NATIONALIST AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS CASE: PYD/YPG (SYRIA) & MADKHALISM (LIBYA) COMPARISON

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ABSTRACT

Civil society is one of the most prominent subjects of comparative politics, and Mary Kaldor's typology of civil society actors in her "Civil Society and Accountability (2003)" article deserves further attention. In this paper, I tired to explain Kaldor's classification, to a certain extent, through studying the concept of civil society. I concantrated on radical PYD/YPG groups in Syria in terms of the nationalist case, whereas I focused on radical Madkhalist groups in Libya in terms of religious case. In this sense, I concluded that there are cetain similarities in three points between nationalist and religious groups in terms of their activities, social compositions and forms of organization. At first, violence is exercised in both groups, which is very dangerous for the people living in those territories. Secondly, exclusion of others is exercised in both groups, which may create new ethnical and religious problems in the future. Thirdly, tendency for establishing armed forces in both groups directly leads to extending the ongoing civil wars and creating new areas of conflict. On the other hand, I detected that there is a clear difference between these two groups, which is loyalty to the regime, which may generate another research topic in itself.

Key Words: Civil Society, Nation, Religion, PYD/YPG, Madkhalism

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INTRODUCTION

Comparative knowledge provides us the ways to "understanding, explaining and interpreting" (Ragin, 1987, p.6). Sartori (1991, p.244) holds that "one may engage in comparative work for any number of reasons but the reason is control". As a field, the main objective of comparative politics is "the building of empirically falsifiable, explanatory theory" (Mayer, 1989, p.12). Lijphart and most others hold that "comparative method is essentially correlational", in other words, "it bases inference about causal relations on covariation between a dependent variable and a small set of independent variables" (Hall, 2003, p.380).

McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2009) claim that two significant points have strong implications for the practice of comparative politics:

> "The first is to recognize that phenomena such as revolutions, social movements, nationalist mobilizations, civil wars, and democratization have common causal properties instead of each constituting an entirely separate causal domain. The second is to treat the causal properties as consisting of recurrent mechanisms and processes that in different combinations and sequences produce contrasting forms of collective claim-making, from nonviolent to violent, from routine to extraordinary, from conservative to transformative." (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2009, p.289).

In this respect, they highlight the importance of "comparisons among the whole range of contention in different times and places" rather than "continuing the age-old comparative study of revolutions, social movements, nationalist mobilizations, civil wars, and democratization taken separately" (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2009, p.289). In such comparisons, we "should take political

regimes explicitly into account, drawing on the systematic theory and evidence that are accumulating on differences in contention among contrasting types of regimes" (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2009, p.289).

One of the most important subjects of comparative politics is the concept of civil society, and Mary Kaldor's typology of civil society actors in her "Civil Society and Accountability (2003)" article deserves further attention. In this paper, I will concantrate on the concept of civil society at first. Then, I will try to explain Kaldor's classification, to a certain extent. In this respect, I will focus on a certain civil society actor, which one is nationalist and religious groups. I will concantrate on radical PYD/YPG groups in Syria in terms of the nationalist case, whereas I will focus on radical Madkhalist groups in Libya in terms of religious case. After that I will determine main patterns regarding these groups on the bases of Kaldor's classification, and I will compare and contrast them depending on these main patterns. Finally, I will share my overall assessment relying on my comparisons and conclude my article.

1. CIVIL SOCIETY IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS AND KALDOR'S ACTOR CLASSIFICATION

Even though the concept of civil society has its origins in the modern period, we clearly observe the term in the earlier periods. In this sense, we see Hegel at first, since he was able to use this term different from the concept of state. According to Hegel, there are three moments of the ethical life, which are

family, civil society and the state. In his dialectical idealism approach, family represents thesis, which is based on universalism. The civil society characterizes anti-thesis, which relies on particularism. Finally, the state symbolizes the synthesis, which encompasses both universalism and particularism at the same time. According to Hegel, civil society is ''the realm of difference, intermediate between the family and the state'' (1996, p.185-186).

This definition somehow creates a base for Marx and later nineteenth-century thinkers. Marx and Engels view state as the concentrated and organised force of society, which is characterized by certain forms of production and their attendant social relations (Kumar, 2015). According to Marx and Engels, the state is subordinate to civil society, and the state is an instrument or apparatus in the hands of the dominant classes (Kaldor, 2003). "That is, the civil society and political society (=state) relationship, as envisaged by Hegel, was turned upside down by Marx and Engels: The state being a transitory phenomenon must therefore, abolish itself after it has first abolished the pre-state natural society." (Kumar, 2015, p.504).

Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, who is regarded as a major thinker in civil society studies, differs from Hegel and Marx with his ideas. According to Gramsci, civil society includes "not all material relationships, but all ideological-cultural relations; not the whole of commercial and industrial life, but the whole of spiritual and intellectual life" (Bobbio, 1988, p.83). Gramsci's

civil society is "the terrain upon which social classes compete for social and political leadership or hegemony over other social classes" (Thomas, 2009, p.137). According to Gramsci, it is not economic structure as such that governs political action, but the interpretation of it; hence, he emphasizes the need for political activism in the realms of education, media and other institutions of civil society (Kaldor, 2003). In this respect, "Gramsci's writing portrays an intricate and dialectic interrelationship between civil society, the state, and hegemony" (Ungsuchaval, 2016, p.45).

Kaldor (2003) broadly distinguishes three different versions of usages of civil society in contemporary terms, which are activist, neoliberal, and postmodern versions. Especially "the post-modern version of civil society would argue for a more culturally sensitive concept, which involves various national and religious groupings and a contestation of narratives" (Kaldor, 2003, p.10). Kaldor holds that "today civil society is transnational, engaged in a process of debate and negotiation with governments, companies and international organizations" (2003, p.11).

In her study, Kaldor (2003) distinguishes four ideal types regarding actors of civil society by stating that they are not actually distinct types since they overlap with each other.

	Social movements[2]	NGOs[3]	Social organizations[4]	Nationalist and religious groups
Mission	Emancipation of the poor and excluded	Development and humanitarian relief	Protection and promotion of members interests	Empowerment of national and religious groups
Activities	Protests, demonstrations, mediatique events	Service provision and advocacy	Service provision, lobbying	Mobilization through media, religious organizations, and sometimes violence
Social composition	Activists, committed individuals, students	Professional staff	Workers, farmers, employers, local communities, displaced persons	Newly urbanized groups, peasants
Forms of organization	Loose horizontal coalitions, network	Ranges from bureaucratic and corporate to small-scale and informal	Ranges from vertical and hierarchical to informal networks	Vertical and hierarchical although can involve networks of tightly organized cells, charismatic leadership

Table-1: Types of Civil Society Actors (Kaldor, 2003, p.12)

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[2]"…Social movements are organizations, groups of people, and individuals, who act together to bring about transformation in society… Social movements rise and fall. Their success depends both on their capacity to mobilize and on the responsiveness of authorities." (Kaldor, 2003, p.12). "Social movements often employ brokerage to bring previously unconnected groups or social networks into the same campaign." (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2009, p.274).

[3]According to Fowler, NGOs are "purposeful, role-bound social units" (1997, p.20). "They are voluntary, in contrast to compulsory organizations like the state or some traditional, religious organizations, and they do not make profits, like corporations." (Kaldor, 2003, p.14).

[4]According to Kaldor (2003), social organizations represent particular sectors of society defined in social terms rather than in cultural or religious terms, and this type of organization is an expression of the structure of society and it changes as society changes.

One of the most important categories of Kaldor's civil society classification is nationalist and religious groups. These are organizations based on particular sections of society, defined in terms of culture, kin or religion (Kaldor, 2003). According to Kaldor (2003), the exact number is not available, however, these groups and movements have increased dramatically especially during the 1990s.

Rueschemeyer (2003, p.319) holds that "when exploring what can be gained from going beyond the confines of a single case, we must confront two deceptively simple questions"; what the case is, and where its boundaries are. In this paper, I will provide two significant cases, one of which is nationalist, and the other is religional.

In terms of the nationalist case, I will focus on PYD/YPG groups in Syria, whereas I will focus on Madkhalist groups in Libya[5] in terms of religious case by laying stress upon post Arab Spring period, when civil war[6] broke out in Syria and Libya. The reason for why I have focused on specific period of time is due to the fact that "time also plays an active role in cases" (Levi, 2009, p.120).

Now, I will determine main patterns regarding these groups on the bases of Kaldor's classification, and I will compare and contrast them depending on these

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[5]"The Madkhalists have extensive transnational networks in the Middle East, Europe, and Southeast Asia." (Pall, 2014, p.10). In this paper, I will just concentrate on Libya, where is one of the main strongholes of the movement.

[6]"Civil wars are large-scale lethal conflicts in which the violence does not occur chiefly as a by-product of nonviolent claim-making, but forms part of claimmaking's central rationale. With civil wars, we enter a realm in which both governments and other political actors regularly use organized armed force as they make claims. Organized armed force ranges from local gangs to disciplined national armies, passing by militias, paramilitaries, private armies, and mercenaries. Sometimes organized armed force remains very one-sided, as when military units attack demonstrators or paramilitaries hunt down labor organizers. But it becomes especially lethal when at least two armed organizations battle each other." (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2009, p.280).

main patterns, which are mission, activities, social composition, and forms of organization.

2. NATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS CASE: PYD/YPG (SYRIA) & MADKHALISM (LIBYA) COMPARISON

2.1. Comparison in Terms of "Mission"

The assigned mission of the PYD/YPG[7] is to be the founding actor of the "Great Kurdistan" planned to be established in the Middle East region (Yahya, 2017). In this respect, the group is aiming to found a state like structure through which it is able create a buffer zone to cut off ties and cooperation between the countries of the region (Yahya, 2017).

On the otherhand, the main mission of the Madkhalists is to attack any critic or opposition, using Islamic scholarship to portray them as heretics or unbelievers (Luck, 2018). In addition, the group is in favour of aversion to politics and opposition to democracy[8], arguing that politics by nature creates divisions among Muslims, encourages loyalty to groups other than God, and allows un-Islamic movements to creep into society (Luck, 2018).

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[7]PYD/YPG is Syrian offshoot of PKK/KCK, which is a radical terrorist organization. "Both Western and Turkish foreign fighters fighting with PKK's Syrian franchises as well as non-Western militants of the YPG and YPJ admit openly that they are of the PKK, from the PKK and for the PKK." (Soner, Aslan, Kıyıcı, 2017, p.18).
[8]"Despite the Madkhalists' negative stance toward the political process, one of the cornerstones of their discourse is showing unquestioning loyalty to the ruler and being harshly critical of those who—in their opinion—disobey him." (Pall, 2014, p.10).

2.2. Comparison in Terms of "Activities"

In many places, these groups and movements have succeeded in relaying a populist message and reaching out particularly to the countryside (Kaldor, 2003). In this respect, television, videos and radio have been particularly important in terms of mobilizing a rural population unused to reading (Kaldor, 2003). Furthermore, these groups provide a sense of ontological security in a society that is rapidly changing, even though it is a form of security based on belief and fear rather than material conditions (Kaldor, 2003). Many, particularly Islamic, groups provide social services and humanitarian relief and, actually, dependence on these organizations is also a method of recruitment, whereas many are linked to criminal activities of various kinds and their socioeconomic strategies are indefinable (Kaldor, 2003).

Especially after the outbreak of Syrian civil war in 2011, PYD/YPG succeeded in using the chaotic milieu for its benefit, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which was formed with direct support of US in 2015, helped PYD/YPG on doing this, to a large extent. SDF was just an umbrella to shadow illegitimate[9] position of PYD/YPG especially in the eyes of Arab population. PYD/YPG benefited from the ongoing figth against DAESH, and utilized SDF coverage in order letigimize itself in the international arena as much as possible.

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[9]"Legitimacy involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society." (Lipset, 1959, p.86). "The distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate users of violence came clear only very slowly, in the process during which the state's armed forces became relatively unified and permanent." (Tilly, 1985, p.173).

The amount of area that is controlled by PYD/YPG increased markedly in Syria especially after 2016 as clearly seen in the following maps.

Map-1-2-3-4: The maps show how the amount of area that is controlled by PYD/YPG increased in Syria through time (Suriye Gündemi, 2016-2017-2018-2019)

Within the Kurdish parties in Syria, PYD, known as the organization that attaches great importance to military structure, has been able to procede successful warfare and struggles with its competitors and enemies; therefore, the actorness of the party is also linked to its military success (İşyar, 2017). By using SDF, PYD/YPG succeds in disseminating a populist message and reaching out particularly to the countryside, where illetarate population is dense.

In direct coordination with core PKK/KCK elements, PYD/YPG uses the similar ideological videos on Facebook, Twitter, etc., and utilizes television and radio channels, such as Stêrk TV, in order to mobilize rural population in northern Syria (Demir, 2018).

However, the reports from media outlets operating in areas controlled by the PYD show that the people faced pressure and received online threats demanding they play pro-PYD songs, and these reports indicate that members of the YPG detained and/or beat some opposition journalists affiliated with the Kurdish National Council (United States Department of State, 2017). A report of the National Coalition of Syrian Opposition and Revolutionary Forces, entitled "Permissible Violations", clearly reveals the abuses of rights by the PYD/YPG groups (Gözellik, 2018). According to the report, PYD/YPG elements killed people under torture whom it had detained forcibly, and caused heavy destructions in regions inhabited by Arab and Turkmen civilians in the north of the country, where the people had to leave their places of residence (Gözellik, 2018). In this sense, PYD/YPG forced over 2 million Arabs, Turkmen and Kurds in different areas in northern Syria to migrate as of 2012 (Gözellik, 2018).

According to the data of the Atlantic Council, since 2012, when the Syrian Regime had withdrawn from northern areas, the Kurdish language was incorporated into the school programs throughout the regions, which are under the control of PYD/YPG administrative cadres (Drwish, 2017). In this respect,

PYD/YPG has also included the subjects of "Kurdish History" and "Zoroastrianism" in the curriculum within the scope of the Kurdish education model it applied in regions under its control (PYD'den Milli Eğitim Modeli, 2017).

We observe similar situations in the Madkhalist case in Libya. Madkhalists also succeeded in using the chaos after the outbreak of Libyan civil war. These Madkhalist groups took advantage of the ongoing civil war atmosphere in Libya and could easily recruit militants/militias particularly from mosques in poor regions (Sivrikaya, 2018).

Sources subordinate to the Libyan Intelligence Service express that Madkhalists currently hold many of important positions within the Libyan Ministry of Foundations (سكية, 2017). In this respect, 80% of the offices under this ministry are noted to be under the control of Madkhalist groups (سكية, 2017). "An increasing number of armed groups subscribing to the Salafi Madkhalist ideology are in charge of the security sector in Libya, specialising in the control of detention centres and intelligence services." (Mannocchi, 2018). In Libya, the mosques in certain areas are under the control of Madkhalists, which allow the group to direct khutbahs (سكية, 2017). Moreover, the group uses the ideological videos on Facebook, Twitter, etc., and utilizes radio stations, portal and platforms (سكية, 2017). Madkhalist groups started to broadcast live lectures on Facebook (Mannocchi, 2018).

Radio Stations Used by Madkhalists	Portals and Platforms Used by Madkhalists
Radio Al-Marj Al-Salafiyya	Shabakah Al-Bayna Al-Salafiyya
Radio Ajdabiya Al-Salafiyya	Shabakah Al-Waraqat Al-Salafiyya
Radio Mishkat	Minber Al-Dawet Al-Salafiyya
Radio İslam	Channel Sabha
Radio Salem	Misurata Al-Salafiyya
Radio Sabel Al-Salaf	Benghazi Al-Salafiyya
Radio Al-Fatwa	Sabratha Al-Salafiyya
Radio Zaid Al-Nabawi	
Radio Ahl Al-Hadith and Al-A'sar	
Radio Al-Zintan Al-Salafiyya	
Radio Miraath Al-Anbiya	

Schema-1: Radio Stations, Portal and Platforms used by Madkhalists (Sivrikaya, 2018)

In Libya, seminars on sharia are held in religious academies under the control of Madkhalist groups and sheiks are brought from abroad for these events (سكية, 2017). In addition, the youth who receive training in those academies are encouraged to become a member of groups at social media and some members marry each other by this way (سكية, 2017). Madkhalists are running 17 Islamic schools in Tripoli, three in Misrata, one in Kufra and recently some in Derna, where they have their own books and also a particular niqab for girls (Mannocchi, 2018).

Madkhalists also carry out some activities in armed groups in overall Libya, and three armed Madkhalist groups conduct activities in region (Ali, 2017). The first one is the Al-Tawhid Brigade which acts in cooperation with Khalifa Haftar in Benghazi region in the east of Libya (Ali, 2017). The second one is the Rada

Forces which acts in the west of Tripoli area in coordination with the National Unity Government supported by the United Nations (Ali, 2017). The third one is the 604th Infantry Battalion which is also active in western Libya in Misurata area (Ali, 2017).

Hence, in each part of Libya, Madkhalists have a consistent strategy: attack, silence, and delegitimize all rivals, including liberals, democrats, the Muslim Brotherhood, jihadists, and rival Salafi groups; in other words, it is a campaign that has strengthened whichever faction it is serving and has put every other actor and civil society group on the defensive (Luck, 2018). They are in ascendance and have made significant inroads in assuming control of multiple security services across the country, regardless of which political factions are locally prepotent (Mcgregor, 2018).

2.3. Comparison in Terms of "Social Composition"

These movements are similar to old social movements, in that they are often mass movements, which include workers and peasants as well as the middle classes (Kaldor, 2003). Religious and nationalist groups tend to be populist and they succeed in reaching out to poor people in a way that neither the new social movements nor the NGOs have been able to do (Kaldor, 2003). A particularly important group of their adherents are young men, students or unemployed frustrated by the lack of opportunities and the exclusions of a globalized world (Kaldor, 2003).

To illustrate, PYD/YPG recruits poor peasants, workers, and even Marksist intellectuals in the northern parts of Syria, most of whom are composed of young people. After a certain period of time, even if the newcomers demand to leave the group, they are exposed to racketeering by the PYD/YPG leadership and forced to fight in the field. In this respect, PYD/YPG's approach likes Charles Tilly's goverment-racketeer analogy, to a large extent. Acoording to Tilly (1985), governments' provision of protection often qualifies as racketeering, in which case a racketeer is defined as someone who creates a threat and then charges for its reduction. The main difference here is the actor, which is a radical nationalist group rather than the state.

Similarly, due to taking advantage of the ongoing civil war atmosphere in Libya, Madkhalist groups also easily recruit militants/militias particularly from mosques in poor regions and increase their strength gradually in region (Sivrikaya, 2018). Especially in 2011 uprisings, Madkhalists made inroads in several poorer neighbourhoods of Tripoli - most notably Buslim, Hadhba and Souq al-Juma, the hometowns of several Madkhalists now prominent in the city's security apparatus - and Benghazi through proselytising and charitable works (International Crisis Group, 2019).

Acoording to Kaldor (2003), nationalist and religious groups differ from old nationalist movements in certain important ways. She strengthens her ideas with those sentences as follows:

> "They tend to be movements based on exclusive identity politics; that is to say, they are claims to political power on the basis of a label, generally ethnic, which excludes and is indeed hostile towards others with a different label… Or they are movements based on exclusive missionary politics; that is to say, claims to political power on the basis of religious practise, which also excludes others with different or non-religious practises." (Kaldor, 2003, p.19).

In this respect, PYD/YPG has frequently been accused of suppressing other Kurdish political parties in Syria, including the Kurdish National Council, an organization with close links to the Iraqi Kurdish political leadership (Bajalan, 2016). Moreover, PYD/YPG also faces allegations of ethnic cleansing in Arab villages and has, at times, used child soldiers (Bajalan, 2016). For instance, a report published in January 2016 by the London based Syrian Network for Human Rights declared that since the withdrawal of Syrian Regime forces in 2012, PYD/YPG has committed significant human rights violations in densely Arab populated towns in northern and northeastern Syria including ethnic cleansing massacres (Kutlugün, 2017). In addition, these exclusion and suppression practices are not only limited with ethnic cleansing massacres. For example, a lot of Arab regions in Hasakah and surroundings located in the northeast of Syria are renamed in Kurdish by PYD/YPG cadres (الأكراد يستعيدون, 2016).

Picture-1: The picture shows how villages are renamed in the western parts of Hasakah. This village's original name is "Al-Shajara/الشجرة", which means "tree" in Arabic. However, the village was renamed as "Çoldara", which means "woodland" in Kurdish (الأكراد يستعيدون, 2016).

We observe the similar approach in Madkhalism, too. Madkhalists call their ideological rivals as *"Kharijites*[10]*"* (Mcgregor, 2017). Sheikh Rabee Ibn Hadi Al-Madkhali claims that hadith is a divine inspiration like Qur'an and "exhortation" mentioned in this verse of Hicr sura *"Verily, it is we who have sent down this exhortation, and most surely we are its guardians"* embraces both Qur'an and hadith (Tunç, 2017). For example, Madkhalists control most of the the mosques in Benghazi, and Sheikh Rabee Ibn Hadi Al-Madkhali's literature is everywhere to the exclusion of work by other scholars, particularly those with whom they disagree[11] (International Crisis Group, 2019). Furthermore, in their sermons Madkhalists denounce not only the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists but also Sufis, secularists, liberals and the idea of democracy and pluralism as a whole (International Crisis Group, 2019).

2.4. Comparison in Terms of "Forms of Organization"

Religious and national groups are organized in traditional vertical and hierarchical ways, often with charismatic leaders even though they can involve networks of tightly organized cells (Kaldor, 2003).

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[10]The Kharijites were members of the earliest sect in Islam that left the followers of Hazrat Ali. The Kharijite theology was a radical fundamentalism, with uncompromised observance of the Quran in defiance of corrupt authorities. Kharijites considered moderate Muslims to be "hypocrites" and "unbelievers" who could be killed with impunity. The Khawarij made takfir of the main body of believers. The Kharijite held that only the most pious members of the community could be entrusted with political power (Kharijite Islam, 2018).

[11]"This inevitably is followed by Friday prayers consolidated statements issued by the Awqaf Authority controlled by the Madkhalism that unified the discourse and focused on the blasphemy and betrayal of cultural elites, liberal ideas and civil society activists, while at the same time appreciating the Libyan Armed Forces led by Haftar, which represented a real threat to the safety of these people and represented a real impediment to spreading a moderate open-minded Human rightsculture within the community." (Mostafa, Belkacem, Ghallab, and Omran, 2017, p.83).

To illustrate, PYD/YPG describes the war in northern Syria as a historic opportunity to implement PKK/KCK program of "democratic self-administration," a system of governance based on imprisoned PKK/KCK leader Abdullah Öcalan's teachings (Stein and Foley, 2016). The group also continues to promote the cult of A.Öcalan through its control of the education system and media (Bajalan, 2016). In this sense, although Salih Muslim is the chairman of PYD/YPG, A.Öcalan is seen as the leader of the group.

Similarly although the idea of Madkhalism is originally based on Saudi Arabia, this formation takes its name from Sheikh Rabee Ibn Hadi Al-Madkhali, the most prominent sheikh of the movement[12] (Akgün and Bozbaş, 2013). "In Saudi Arabia, where Salafism is dominant, this idea was very well articulated by Sheikh Rabee Ibn Hadi Al-Madkhali, according to whom Muslims should adhere to the principle that the Arab rulers have the legitimate right to act in the name of the Muslim Ummah as long as they maintain their basic adherence to Islam and the public call to prayer in the land." (Malik, 2016, p.51).

There is a strange tension between the current PKK/KCK discourse of democracy, autonomy and bottom-up grass-roots self-organization and the consistently hierarchical, centralistic and top-down organization that the PKK/KCK has maintained in practice (Leezenberg, 2016). We see the same

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[12]In some sources, Madkhalism is also named as "Al-Jaameeyyah" referring to Ethiopian Sheikh Muhammad Amaan Al-Jaamee who is accepted as the founder, too (Akgün and Bozbaş, 2013).

paradox in its Syrian offshoot, PYD/YPG, and the group adapts a rigid hierarchical structure.

Political Islam aims at implementing a type of state leadership where religion is prioritized and connects the existence of religion and its maintenance directly with the ruling power[13] (Çay, 2015). We observe a similar hierarchical structure in Madkhalist groups in Libya under the leadership of Sheikh Rabee Ibn Hadi Al-Madkhali, who also acts through directions from Saudi Arabia.

When it was formed in 2003, PYD/YPG established clear political foundations at first. After the outbreak of Syrian civil war, PYD/YPG introduced a provisional constitution and new laws which are in force across the territory under their control (Amnesty International, 2015). The group also established ministries, a military and police force, and established a judicial system, too (Amnesty International, 2015). The military and security structures of which the YPG make up the major force are all connected to the PYD and their totalitarian ideology (Rashid, 2018). The outcome is military structures that are instruments for political parties with specific agendas to execute local policies that have unfavorable impacts on a local and regional level (Rashid, 2018). "The capacity and sustainability of these organizations is mostly dependent on the consistency of their foreign backers." (Rashid, 2018, p.66).

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[13]Power is key to understanding both behavior and institutions, that is to say, who has power and how they use it tells us a lot about the nature of the society (Levi, 2009).

In the Madkhalist case, their unquestioning assistance of dictatorships, reluctance to politics, and hostility toward both democracy and the Muslim Brotherhood made the group an ideal partner for the regime of Muammar Qaddafi, who opened Libya to the group in the early 2000s (Luck, 2018). "In recent years, Madkhalism is seen to be supported especially by General Khalifa Haftar's wing and used against Muslim Brotherhood under the rhetoric of countering terror in Libya" (Sivrikaya, 2018). "Their ideology allows them to transcend tribal, ethnic and regional divides, and they are perhaps unique in having built a presence across the country, allying with local forces on different sides of the conflict" (International Crisis Group, 2019). "Reliable salaries, superior weapons and a degree of legal immunity ensure a steady supply of recruits to the Madkhalist militias." (Mcgregor, 2018, p.11).

CONCLUSION

As we have seen in the two cases, Kaldor's ideas on civil society and her classification regarding civil society actors are so precious in the field of comparative politics. Getting into both cases, we have seen that there are cetain similarities between nationalist and religious groups in terms of their activities, social compositions and forms of organization.

At first, we have observed that violence is exercised in both groups, which is very dangerous for the people living in those territories. Secondly, we have seen that exclusion of others is exercised in both groups, which may create new

ethnical and religious problems in the future. Thirdly, we have detected the tendency for establishing armed forces in both groups, which directly leads to extending the ongoing civil wars and creating new areas of conflict.

On the other hand, there is a clear difference that we have discovered as we compared these two groups, which is loyalty to the regime. The main trend in our nationalist case is shaped around revolting against the existing regime via demanding right to self-determination. However, we observe loyalty to the regime in our religious case. In this respect, since the threat comes directly from the radical nationalist groups, the regimes are able to take necessary precautions, whereas permeation of radical religious groups under the umbrella of loyalty to the regime may result in more severe repercussions for the exisiting regimes as experienced in 15 July Coup Attempt in Turkey.

Similarites

- exercise of violence
- exclusion of others
- establishing armed forces

Differences

- loyalty to the regime

Schema-2: The similarities and differences between nationalist and religious groups

In a nutshell, I tried to emphasize the significance of civil society in the field of comparative politics via application of Kaldor's civil society actors' classification. In this respect, I concentrated on a specific nationalist and religious case through a detailed comparison based on main patterns. Finally, I shared my overall assessment relying on my comparisons. Here it is so crucial to mention that it is inevitable to observe deviations regarding the repercussions of these groups on the bases of time, place etc. Generalization may mislead us in our analyses since "no single subject can suffice, and no mode of analysis ever can be entirely self-sufficient" (Katznelson, 2009, p.116).

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